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JACKSON V. BENSON: SCHOOL VOUCHERS-OFFERING
AN APPLE TO PRIVATE SCHOOLS; CREATING A SERPENT
FOR PUBLIC SCHOOLS
JENNIFER A. HENRIKSON*

Establishment Clause cases are some of the "most perplexing
questions to come before [the Supreme] Court."
-Justice Powell1
INTRODUCTION

Last June, the Wisconsin Supreme Court in Jackson v. Benson,
upheld the constitutionality of the Milwaukee Parental Choice
Program (the "MPCP"), which allows a select group of Milwaukee
public school students to use publicly funded school vouchers to
attend religious schools.2 In November 1998, the U.S. Supreme Court
declined to hear the case. 3 The Court's denial of certiorari not only
left open the potential for other states to adopt standards that offend
the Establishment Clause of the United States Constitution, but also
left open the potential of harm to public school education.
Although Supreme Court decisions had considered "firmly
rooted '4 limitations of the Establishment Clause, the denial of
certiorari in Jackson threatens to uproot this firm ground. Until the
Court reinforces the impermissibility of certain types of stateprovided aid to religious schools,5 courts like Jackson will continue to
offend past Court jurisprudence to the detriment of the public
schools.
* J.D. Candidate, Chicago-Kent College of Law, 2001; B.A., Economics and
Management, DePauw University. The author wishes to thank Professor Susan Valentine for
her guidance and suggestions and Jeremy Noe and Andy Henrikson for their valuable editing of
this Comment.
1. Committee for Pub. Educ. v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756, 760 (1973).
2. 578 N.W.2d at 608.
3. See Jan Crawford Greenburg, Top Court Lets School Voucher Plan Stand, CHI. TRIB.,
Nov. 10, 1998, at 1.
4. Nyquist, 413 U.S. at 761.
5. The Supreme Court recently granted certiorari to decide whether instructional
materials paid by a state can be used in religious schools. See Helms v. Picard, No. 97-30231,
1998 WL 483916 at *1 (5th Cir. Aug. 17, 1998), cert. granted, 1999 WL 231469 (U.S. June 14,
1999). This could affect the national debate over school vouchers.
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The Wisconsin Supreme Court attempted in Jackson v. Benson
to synthesize past U.S. Supreme Court cases and summarize the
Court's position. The Jackson court struggled with what it thought
was conflicting Supreme Court guidance in holding that "state
programs that are wholly neutral in offering educational assistance
directly to citizens in a class defined without reference to religion do
'6
not have the primary effect of advancing religion."
Although this rule is one of the factors courts consider in an
Establishment Clause inquiry, proving this rule alone is insufficient.
Another rule evident in the Supreme Court decisions examined by
the Jackson court is the inquiry of whether state aid to religious
schools realistically can be separated from the schools' religious
functions.7 By failing to conduct this additional inquiry, the Jackson
court ruled that state aid for tuition to religious schools is permissible.
However, as discussed in this Comment, such a practice violates the
Establishment Clause of the United States Constitution. Without
Supreme Court guidance, other states are likely to rely on the
Jackson decision and ratify similarly unconstitutional programs.
Part I of this Comment begins with an overview of the
Establishment Clause and the test used to determine a violation of
the Clause. It then discusses the Supreme Court cases leading up to
the Jackson decision. This Comment classifies the cases into three
categories based on the type of state-provided aid at issue, including:
(1) state aid for specific services and special needs; (2) state aid for
instructional materials and equipment; and (3) state aid for tuition
reimbursements or tax deductions.
Part II discusses the MPCP enacted in 1989 and amended
significantly in 1995. It then discusses the Wisconsin Supreme Court
decision in Jackson v. Benson, centering on the court's reasoning for
finding that the MPCP does not have the primary effect of advancing
religion.
Finally, Part III addresses the urgent need for the Court to take a
stand on the constitutionality of school voucher programs under the
Establishment Clause. It proposes that Establishment Clause inquiry
expand to include examining whether the type of aid "realistically"
can be separated from religious schools' nonsecular functions. If the
6. Jackson, 578 N.W.2d at 613.
7. See Meek v. Pittenger, 421 U.S. 349, 365 (1975) (ruling that separating maps, charts and
laboratory equipment from use for religious purposes was unrealistic and thus had the primary
effect of advancing religion).
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aid cannot be realistically separated, the Establishment Clause is
violated. Part III then asserts that the MPCP has the primary effect
of advancing religion because tuition-unlike textbooks and special
services -realistically cannot be applied only to the secular programs
of religious schools. Such a conclusion is the only consistent approach
given the Supreme Court's earlier jurisprudence.
I.

HISTORY OF STATE AID To RELIGIOUS SCHOOLS

A.

The FirstAmendment EstablishmentClause

The First Amendment to the U.S. Constitution provides, in part,
that "Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of
religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof. '8 The Establishment
Clause provides protection against three main evils: "sponsorship,
financial support, and active involvement of the sovereign in religious
activity."9 Accordingly, the Establishment Clause prohibits state
legislatures from passing laws that have the purpose or effect of
advancing or inhibiting religion through the Fourteenth
Amendment.10 The Supreme Court notes that Establishment Clause
cases "raise difficult issues of interpretation" and are some of the
"most perplexing questions to come before [the] Court."',
B.

The Lemon Test

Alleged Establishment Clause violations are analyzed using a
three prong test articulated by the Court in Lemon v. Kurtzman.l" In
developing the test, the Court in Lemon stated that "[t]he
Constitution decrees that religion must be a private matter for the
individual, the family, and the institutions of private choice, and that
while some involvement and entanglement are inevitable, lines must
be drawn." 3 The Court faced the constitutional question of whether
a state could supplement a nonpublic school teacher's annual salary
for teaching religious subjects."4 In reaching its decision, the Court
8. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
9. Jackson, 578 N.W.2d at 612.
10. See id. at 611.
11. Id. at 611 (citing Committee for Pub. Educ. v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756, 760 (1973)).
12. 403 U.S. 602 (1971); see also Michael J. Stick, Educational Vouchers: A Constitutional
Analysis, 28 COLUM. J.L. & SOC. PROBS., 423,433 (1995).
13. Lemon, 403 U.S. at 625.
14. See id. at 607.
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declared that a statute does not violate the Establishment Clause if

(1) it has a secular, legislative purpose; (2) its principal or primary
effect neither advances nor inhibits religion; and (3) it does not create
excessive entanglement between government and religion.15
Applying this test, the Lemon Court first determined that the Rhode
Island legislature intended "to enhance the quality of secular
education" and not advance religion.16 Without addressing the

primary effects prong of the test, the Court concluded, based on the
third prong, that the statute created excessive entanglement between
the church and the state. 17 The prohibited entanglement included
state surveillance of religious teachings, as well as state auditing of the

nonpublic school's per pupil spending records. 8
C.

Legal Landscape

Over the past thirty years, thirteen Supreme Court decisions
addressed the issue of separation between religion and public school
education, with most of these cases revolving around some sort of
state aid to religious schools. 19 After the Lemon decision, the

Supreme Court applied the Lemon test to many subsequent
Establishment Clause cases. However, the definition of the second
prong of the test became more unclear over subsequent years. For

example, in separate decisions, the Court ruled that the stateprovided aid met the effects test if it was: (a) discrete and clearly
15. See id. at 612.
16. Id. at 613.
17. See id. at 619.
18. See id, at 620.
19. See generally Agostini v. Felton, 521 U.S. 203 (1997) (addressing public school teachers
providing remedial education in nonpublic schools); Zobrest v. Catalina Foothills Sch. Dist., 509
U.S. 1 (1993) (addressing state provided interpreter to disabled student in Catholic school);
Witters v. Washington Dep't of Serv. for the Blind, 474 U.S. 481 (1986) (addressing state
assistance to blind person studying at christian college); Aguilar v. Felton, 473 U.S. 402 (1985)
(addressing public school teachers in sectarian classrooms); School Dist. v. Ball, 473 U.S. 373
(1985) (addressing public school teachers in sectarian classrooms); Mueller v. Allen, 463 U.S.
388 (1983) (addressing taxpayer deduction for expenses of sending children to parochial
schools); Committee for Pub. Educ. v. Regan, 444 U.S. 646 (1980) (addressing state funds used
to reimburse church-sponsored schools for testing services); Wolman v. Walter, 433 U.S. 229
(1977) (addressing state money to nonpublic schools used to purchase textbooks, instructional
materials and equipment); Meek v. Pittenger, 421 U.S. 349 (1975) (addressing state loan of
textbooks, equipment and auxiliary services to nonpublic schools); Committee for Pub. Educ. v.
Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756 (1973) (addressing state aid of maintenance, repair, tuition grants and tax
benefits to parents of children attending private schools); Lemon, 403 U.S. 602 (addressing state
salary supplement to private school teachers); Board of Educ. v. Allen, 392 U.S. 236 (1968)
(addressing state textbook loan to private schools); Everson v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. 1
(1947) (addressing state provided bus transportation to parochial schools).
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identifiable from religious functions of a school; 20 (b) neutral toward
religion;21 (c) the result of the private choice of the aid recipient;22 (d)
not traceable to the coffers of religious schools;23 and (e) not
providing a financial incentive for students to attend a religious
school.2 4 Despite this lack of focus, the Supreme Court declined to
25
hear the Jackson case and clarify its definition of the second prong.
Accordingly, courts must continue to turn to past Supreme Court
jurisprudence for guidance. When past Establishment Clause Court
decisions are classified by type of state-provided aid a pattern
emerges. Organized under this paradigm, past Supreme Court
decisions fall into three categories: (1) specific services and special
needs; (2) instructional materials and equipment; and (3) tuition or
tax relief to parents. These categories may be the key to clarifying
what the Supreme Court implicitly considers when deciding
Establishment Clause violations.
1.

State Aid for Specific Services and Special Needs

According to several Supreme Court decisions, state aid for
specific secular services and special needs does not violate the
Establishment Clause. 26
Specifically, no Establishment Clause
violation occurs when a state provides aid for testing,27 bus
transportation, 28 and special education. 29 In determining whether aid
in this category is a constitutional violation, the Court focuses on
whether the aid is "clearly identifiable ' 30 and hence easily separable
from a school's religious functions.
For example, in evaluating testing services in both Committee for
Public Education v. Regan3' and Wolman v. Walter,3 2 the Court held
that public funds paid to reimburse sectarian schools for state20. See Regan, 444 U.S. at 660.
21. See Everson, 330 U.S. at 18.
22. See Witters, 474 U.S. at 488.
23. See Zobrest, 509 U.S. at 10.
24. See Allen, 392 U.S. at 244.
25. See Jackson v. Benson, 578 N.W.2d 602 (Wis. 1998), cert. denied, 199 S.Ct. 466 (1998).
26. See generally Agostini v. Felton, 521 U.S. 203 (1997); Wolman v. Walter, 433 U.S. 229
(1977); Everson v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. 1 (1947).
27. See Wolman, 433 U.S. at 244.
28. See Everson, 330 U.S. at 18.
29. See Agostini, 521 U.S. at 203.
30. Committee for Pub. Educ. v. Regan, 444 U.S. 646,660 (1980).
31. See id.
32. 433 U.S. at 229.
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required testing services did not violate the Establishment Clause.
Because the state prepared the tests and nonpublic school personnel
merely administered them, the nonpublic schools controlled neither
the test's content nor their results. 3 Although the state reimbursed
the nonpublic schools directly, the costs were for specific activities
also performed in the public schools. 34 Consequently, the state
reimbursements for the testing services were "discrete and clearly
identifiable."35 Thus, applying the second prong of the Lemon test,
the Court ruled that the testing activity performed by nonpublic
school personnel did not have the impermissible effect of advancing
36
religion.
In addition to testing services, the Court has held it to be
constitutionally permissible for states to fund bus transportation to
religious schools. 37 In Everson v. Board of Education, a taxpayer
challenged the constitutionality of a statute granting public schools
the right to reimburse parents of parochial school students for the
cost of public transportation to school. 38 The same statute also
39
granted the right to reimburse parents of public school students.
The Everson Court likened the bus fare reimbursement to policemen
protecting school children from traffic hazards. n° Just as parochial
schools would find it very difficult to operate without policemen to
protect the children walking to school, such schools' operation would
be hampered without transportation being available. 41 The Court
42
noted that the state's role should not handicap religious schools.
Because the state contributed no money to the religious schools, the
Court found that the state did not support them. 43 The statute did no
more than provide a general program to help parents get their

33. See Regan, 444 U.S. at 656.
34. Referring to testing materials, the Regan Court stated that "there does not appear to be
any reason why payments to sectarian schools to cover the cost of specified activities would
have the impermissible effect of advancing religion if the same activities performed by sectarian
school personnel without reimbursement but with State-furnished materials have no such
affect." Id. at 658.
35. Id. at 660.
36. See id. at 658.
37. See Everson v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 18 (1947).
38. See id. at 3. In Everson, the parochial school curriculum included regular religious
instruction conforming to the religious beliefs of the Catholic Church. See id.
39. See id.
40. See id. at 17.
41. See id. at 18.
42. See id.
43. See id.

1999]

JACKSON V. BENSON: SCHOOL VOUCHERS

children to school, regardless of religion, safely."a
The Court also has held several times that specific special
education services provided by the state to religious schools do not
violate the Establishment Clause. 5 For example, in Witters v.
Washington Department of Services,46 an eligible blind student at a
private Christian college sought vocational educational assistance
provided under a state statute. 47 Without expressly applying the
Lemon test, the Court concluded that assistance provided to the
visually handicapped was not a likely vehicle for subsidizing a
religious institution. 48 No more than a "minuscule amount" of the aid
in Witters would likely flow to religious education.49 In addition, the
aid flowed to religious institutions as a result of the "private choices
of aid recipients."50 The aid went directly to the student and not the
educational institution.1
Another example of special education services is Zobrest v.
CatalinaFoothills School District5 2 where a public school invoked the
Establishment Clause to refuse to provide a deaf student with a sign
language interpreter while attending a Catholic High School.53 The
Court concluded that providing a neutral government service on the
premises of a sectarian school as a part of a general program does not
offend the Establishment Clause. 4 The Court emphasized that an
55
interpreter does no more than sign what is being taught in the class.
Therefore, the interpreter himself does not advance any religious
ideals under the second prong of the Lemon test.5 6 In addition, the
Court recognized that no funds traceable to the government ever
found their way into the sectarian school.57
A final example of special education services is Agostini v.
44. See id.
45. See generally Zobrest v. Catalina Foothills Sch. Dist., 509 U.S. 1 (1993) (addressing
state aid to deaf student); Witters v. Washington Dep't of Serv., 474 U.S. 481 (1986) (addressing
state aid to blind student).
46. 474 U.S.481.
47. See id. at 483.
48. See id at 488.
49. Id. at 486.
50. Id. at 488.
51. See id. at 488.
52. 509 U.S. 1 (1993).
53. See id at 4.
54. See id. at 10.
55. See id. at 13.
56. See id.
57. See id. at 10.
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Felton, 8 where the Supreme Court overturned its earlier Aguilar v.
Felton decision.5 9 The Court in Aguilar barred, by injunction, New

York City public school teachers from providing remedial education
to disadvantaged students in parochial schools using Title I Federal
Funds.60 Title I funds could only be applied to secular and neutral
services, and then only to supplement, not replace, services already
provided by private schools. 61 Twelve years later, the parties in
Aguilar sought relief from the injunction. 6 The Agostini Court
overruled Aguilar63 based, in part, on subsequent Establishment
Clause decisions like Zobrest64 and Witters.65 The Agostini Court
emphasized that it was no longer presumed that public school

employees imparted religion in the parochial school setting.66 In
addition, the Title I program was available to all eligible remedial
students regardless of the school each chose to attend. 67 Since Title I

funds never reached the "coffers of religious schools" there was no
financial incentive for parents to choose a sectarian school based on
the Title I program. 68 Thus, the second prong of the Lemon test was
met.

69

In contrast to special education services, the Court in Nyquist v.

Committee for Public Education70 held that a maintenance and repair
grant to religious schools violated the Establishment Clause.71 The
58. 521 U.S. 203 (1997).
59. See id. at 219.
60. See id. Federal Title I funds provide "remedial education, guidance, and job counseling
to eligible students." Id.
61. See id. at 204.
62. See id.
63. However, the Agostini Court specifically noted that this decision is not a green light for
lower courts to view earlier Establishment Clause Supreme Court precedent as overruled. See
id. at 217.
64. The Zobrest Court rejected the theory that merely placing public school employees in
religious school settings promoted religion in students. See Agostini v. Felton, 521 U.S. 203, 216
(1997) (citing Zobrest v. Catalina Foothills Sch. Dist., 509 U.S. 1, 13 (1993)).
65. The Witters Court viewed any funds that ultimately went to religious schools as a result
of the private choices of parents similar to a paycheck of a state employee where the employee
donates part of the money to a church. See id. at 211 (citing Witters v. Washington Dep't of
Serv. for the Blind, 474 U.S. 481, 488 (1986)).
66. See id. at 215; see also Zobrest v. Catalina Foothills Sch. Dist., 509 U.S. 1,13 (1993).
67. See Agostini, 521 U.S. 203, 204. Under this presumption, strict monitoring of public
school Title I teachers in the parochial school settings was unnecessary. Accordingly, the Court
ruled that the Title I program resulted in no "excessive" entanglement that advanced or
inhibited religion. Id.
68. Id. at 213.
69. See id. at 216.
70. 413 U.S. 756 (1973).
71. See id. at 779. A qualifying school must be designated as serving a high concentration
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grant did not require that expenditures relating to upkeep be
confined to buildings used exclusively for secular purposes.7" In fact,
a nonpublic school's entire maintenance and repair budget could be
financed from the grant.7 3 The Court viewed barring schools from
using the funds to maintain nonsecular parts of the religious schools
as impractical, if not impossible.7 4 As a result, the grant violated the
second prong of the Lemon test. On the other hand, the Court
reiterated that where forms of aid can be channeled to support only a
religious school's secular functions, no Establishment Clause violation
exists.7"
2.

State Aid for Instructional Materials and Equipment

The Supreme Court generally has held that aid in the form of
textbooks loaned to religious schools and used for subjects also taught
76
in the public schools is permissible under the Establishment Clause.
On the other hand, the Court has rejected the direct loan of other
equipment and instructional materials.77
For example, in Board of Education v. Allen, the board
challenged the constitutionality of a New York statute that required
local school boards to loan textbooks free of charge to all students in
the district regardless of whether the school was public or private.78
Under the statute, only secular textbooks approved by public school
authorities could be loaned.7 9 Accordingly, no funds or books were
furnished directly to parochial schools. The Court ruled that the loan
of secular textbooks to private schools did not violate the
In reaching its decision, the Court
Establishment Clause. 8°
emphasized that the financial benefit provided in this case was to
parents and children, not the religious schools. 81 The Court also
emphasized the neutrality of the statute by stating that "[tlhe law
merely ma[de] available to all children the benefits of a general
of pupils from low-income families. See id. at 763.
72. See id. at 774.
73. See id.
74. See id.
75. See id. at 775.
76. See generally Meek v. Pittenger, 421 U.S. 349 (1975); Board of Educ. v. Allen, 392 U.S.
236 (1968).
77. See Meek, 421 U.S. at 366.
78. See Allen, 392 U.S. at 238.
79. See id. at 245.
80. See id. at 248.
81. See id. at 243-44.
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program to lend school books free of charge. 8 2 Since the statute was
neutral, the Court ruled that the state aid met the second prong of the
83
Lemon test.

Similarly, in Meek v. Pittenger,84 the Court addressed the
constitutionality of a state program loaning textbooks, equipment and
other instructional materials to nonpublic schools.8 5 The state limited
textbook loans to only those texts used in the public schools.

86

The

Court ruled that the program did not violate the Establishment
Clause. 87 Like the textbook program in Allen, the Meek textbook
loan program extended to all school children free of charge. 8 In
theory, the textbook loan program benefited the parents and
children, not the nonpublic schools. 89 As a result, the Court ruled that
the textbook loan program met the second prong of the Lemon testy0
On the other hand, the Meek Court ruled that the direct loan of
equipment and other instructional materials to sectarian schools
failed the second prong of the Lemon test by having the primary
effect of advancing religion. 91 Although the statute earmarked the
equipment and materials for secular purposes, separating secular uses
from uses for religious purposes was unrealisticY0 The material and
equipment included maps, charts and laboratory equipment. 93 The
Court recognized that the materials might indeed initially be used
exclusively for secular purposes; however, there was no guarantee
that use would not change to religious purposes in the future. 94
The Court in Wolman v. Walter 5 also found the loan of
instructional materials and equipment to nonpublic schools to be
unconstitutional. 96 Although in theory the state loaned the materials
82. Id. at 243.
83. See id. at 248.
84. 421 U.S. 349 (1975).
85. Id. at 354. Instructional materials included "periodicals, photographs, maps, charts,
sound recordings, films, or any other printed and published materials of a similar nature." Id. at
355. Equipment included "projection equipment, recording equipment, [and] laboratory
equipment." Id.
86. See id. at 354.
87. See id. at 360-61.
88. See id. at 361.
89. See id.
90. See id. at 362.
91. See id. at 363.
92. See id. at 365.
93. See id. at 355.
94. See id.
95. 433 U.S. 229 (1977).
96. See id at 251. The Court had no difficulty determining that the statute's purpose was
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to parents and children, the Court saw the program in substance as
the same as the one at issue in Meek. 97 Like the situation in Meek, it
was impossible to separate secular from sectarian educational
functions. 9 Thus, part of the aid flowed to the school's religious
function and failed the Lemon effects test.99
3.

State Aid for Tuition Reimbursements or Tax Deductions

The Supreme Court has addressed the issue of tuition
reimbursement in only two cases: Committee for Public Education v.
Nyquist'0 and Mueller v. Allen.10t Based on these opinions, it appears
that the Supreme Court viewed state aid for tuition as impermissible
because it was not reasonably separable from the school's religious
functions.
For example, in Nyquist, the Court ruled that the New York
tuition reimbursement program violated the Establishment Clause. 102
New York's 1972 amendments to its education and tax laws 10 3
included aid for tuition to low-income parents of children attending
nonpublic schools. 1 4 Each parent submitted a receipted tuition bill to
the Commissioner of Education, and the commissioner reimbursed
the parent directly. 105 For parents failing to qualify for the tuition
grant, the aid program allowed a tax deduction up to a maximum
adjusted gross income based on a formula unrelated to the actual
tuition paid by parents to the nonpublic schools.10 6
The Court held that the tuition grant failed the "effects" test of
the Lemon inquiry.107 Echoing its concerns regarding maintenance
grants, the Nyquist Court held that it was impossible to guarantee that
secular. The legislature's legitimate interest was to provide a "fertile educational environment
for all the schoolchildren of the State." Id. at 236.
97. See id. at 250.
98. See id.
99. See id.
100. 413 U.S. 756 (1973).
101. 463 U.S. 388 (1983).
102. See Nyquist, 413 U.S. at 798.
103. See id. at 761.
104. See id. at 764.
105. See id.
106. See id. at 765.
107. See id. at 780. In addressing the first prong of the Lemon test, the Nyquist Court
acknowledged the public school's concern of an overburdened public school system in the event
that nonpublic school children abandoned them for the public school system. See id. at 773.
However, the Court concluded that even though the legislature did not intend for the
amendment to promote religion, evaluating the amendment against the other two prongs of the
Lemon test was essential. See id.
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use of the tuition grants would be exclusively for "secular, neutral,
and nonideological purposes."'1 8 The Court went on to evaluate

whether it was significant that the grants were paid directly to parents
rather than to the schools. 1 9 The Court noted that by reimbursing
parents for tuition to nonpublic schools, the state relieved parents
financially and thus kept open their option to select religion-oriented

schools. 110 Although the purpose of the assistance was to protect the
overburdened public schools, the effect was to provide financial

support to sectarian schools, and hence was impermissible. For these
same reasons, the Nyquist Court also concluded that the tax
deductions 1 ' assisting parents who send their children to sectarian
schools" 2 were also impermissible."'
By contrast, in Mueller, Minnesota taxpayers challenged the
constitutionality of a state statute that allowed taxpayers a deduction
for their children's tuition, textbook, and transportation expenses in
attending elementary or secondary school." 4 Even though tuition
realistically could not be separated from use for religious purposes,
the Court upheld the aid as constitutional."5 The Court stressed the
neutrality of the tax benefit to all families regardless of type of
school. 116 Even though the Court admitted that financial assistance
provided to parents had the ultimate economic effect of aid given
directly to schools," 7 it found no constitutional violation. The Court
clearly considered the form of the aid important in this case by
108. Id. "In short, the Nyquist Court condemned all funds distributed to sectarian schools
that could be used without restriction." Peter M. Kimball, Opening the Door to School Choice
in Wisconsin: Is Agostini v. Felton the Key?, 81 MARQ. L. REv. 843, 856 (1998).
109. See Committee for Pub. Educ v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756, 783 (1973).
110. See id.
111. See id. at 793. Whether a parent is offered a direct tuition reimbursement or a tax
deduction, both involve a payment by the state for the purpose of religious education. See id. at
765.
112. The amendment provided tax benefits to low-income parents whose children attended
nonpublic schools. See id. at 790. In reaching its decision, the Court considered that the tax
deductions were unrelated to actual tuition paid by parents. See id. at 766.
113. See id. at 793. "However great our sympathy, for the burdens experienced by those
who must pay public school taxes at the same time that they support other schools because of
the constraints of 'conscience and discipline' and notwithstanding the 'high social importance' of
the State's purposes, neither may justify an eroding of the limitations of the Establishment
Clause now firmly implanted." Id.
114. See Mueller v. Allen, 463 U.S. 388, 388 (1983).
115. See id. at 404. In looking to the first prong of the Lemon test, the Court found that the
statute had a secular legislative purpose by stating that a state's decision to defray the cost to
parents of educational expenses was both secular and understandable. See id. at 395. The
statute has a secular purpose of "ensuring that the state citizenry is well-educated." Id.
116. See id. at 397.
117. See id. at 399.
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emphasizing that the taxpayer deduction was not a direct payment to
the schools. 118 Thus, it ruled that the state's financial assistance met
the second prong of the Lemon test.
II. STATE AID VIA SCHOOL VOUCHERS
A.

The Milwaukee ParentalChoice Program

In response to the declining achievement of black students in the
Milwaukee Public Schools, the Wisconsin legislature enacted the
MPCP in 1989 and amended it in 1993.119 The program, as amended,
permitted up to 1.5% of eligible Milwaukee Public School pupils to
attend, free of charge, any nonsectarian private school in the City of

Milwaukee. 10 Eligibility requirements limited program participation
to pupils from families having an income less than 1.75 times the
121
federal poverty level.
In 1995, the Wisconsin legislature once again significantly
amended the MPCP. 122 The biggest change removed the limitation
118. See id.
119. See Jackson v. Benson, 578 N.W.2d 602, 607 (Wis. 1998), cert denied, 119 S.Ct. 466
(1998). Milwaukee Public School statistics showed that only 23% of 10th grade black children
read at or above the national average in the 1988-89 school year; see David Nicholson, Schools
In Transition; Parents and Educators Try Three New Approaches; Neighborhood Control, a
University Affiliation and Parental Choice, WASH. POST, Aug. 5, 1990, at R01. Black students
also accounted for 71% of those suspended although they only made up 50% of the student
population. See id.
120. See Jackson, 578 N.W.2d at 607.
121. See id. at 608. Under the original MPCP, the private schools received payments directly
from the state "equal to the amount of state aid per student" that the Milwaukee Public Schools
would have been entitled to under school aid distribution formulas. Id. Consequently, the state
reduced the amount of aid paid to the Milwaukee Public Schools by the amount paid to private
schools under the program. See id.
122. See id. at 608. Significant amendments to the MPCP statute include:
(2)(b)

any pupil in grades kindergarten to 12 who resides within the city may
attend, at no charge, any private school located in the city if all of the
following apply:
1. The pupil is a member of a family that has a total family income that
does not exceed an amount equal to 1.75 times the poverty level . . .

(5)(b)

No more than 15% of the school district's membership may attend private
schools under this section.

(4)

Upon receipt from the pupil's parent or guardian of proof of the pupil's
enrollment in the private school, the state superintendent shall pay to the
parent or guardian. . . an equal amount to the total amount to which the
school district is entitled under §121.08 divided by the school district
membership, or an equal amount to the private school's operating and
debt service cost per pupil that is related to educational programming. ..
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that participating private schools be "nonsectarian.' 1 23 Additionally,
instead of paying the private school directly, the state paid the pupil's
parent or guardian. 124 However, the amendment directed the
Department of Public Instruction to send the check directly to the
private school, where the parent or guardian then "restrictively
125
endorse[d] the check for the use of the private school.
The amendment also changed the amount paid to the lesser of
the Milwaukee Public School's per student state aid or the private
school's "operating and debt service cost per pupil.' ' 26 However, the
majority of sectarian private schools' tuition for non MPCP students
is less than both the state-provided aid and the operating and debt
service cost per pupil. 27 Consequently, in some cases, the state
payment for MPCP students covered the full cost of their education at
the private school. 2 ' Moreover, the MPCP did not restrict the private
sectarian schools in their use of these funds. 129 Thus, payment of
salaries to employees affiliated with the school's religious mission,
purchase of religious materials, and maintenance of schools used for
1 30
religious purposes were all allowed under the MPCP.
Finally, the amendment allowed MPCP participants to "opt-out"
of participating in religious activities at the sectarian school."' With
whichever is less. The department shall send the check to the private
school. The parent or guardian shall restrictively endorse the check for
the use of the private school.
A private school may not require a pupil attending the private school
under this section to participate in any religious activity if the pupil's
parent or guardian submits to the pupil's teacher or the private school's
principal a written request that the pupil be exempt from such activities.
WIS. STAT. § 119.23 (1997).
123. Jackson v. Benson, 578 N.W.2d 602, 608 (Wis. 1998), cert denied, 119 S.Ct. 466 (1998).
124. See id. at 609.
125. Id.
126. Id.
127. See Jackson v. Benson, 570 N.W.2d 407, 414 (1997). The difference between the cost of
educating students at the private sectarian schools and the tuition charged for parents is
subsidized by the affiliated parishes and congregations. See id.
128. For example, at Blessed Trinity School in Milwaukee, the 1998-99 MPCP state payment
covers the full cost of education for the student. See Tamara Henry, The Voucher Divide
Education Issue is in States' Hands, USA TODAY, Jan. 5, 1999, at ID.
129. See Jackson, 570 N.W.2d at 414.
130. See id.
131. Jackson v. Benson, 578 N.W.2d 602, 609 (Wis. 1998), cert denied, 119 S.Ct. 466 (1998).
Some participating sectarian private schools' mission statement included: "We believe our
school exists to carry out the Savior's command to 'go and make disciples' (Matthew 28:19)."
Jackson, 570 N.W.2d at 413. "Our curriculum offerings place Christ as the focal point for all
study." Id. "The Bible forms the core and center upon which all instruction is based ... All
subjects are taught by a Christian teacher in the light of God's Word, emphasizing God's love
7(c)
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this amendment, the program expanded not only the number of
1 but also the number of eligible
students allowed to participate, 32

private schools.'33
B.

Jackson v. Benson

In August 1995, just six days after Governor Tommy Thompson
signed the amended MPCP into law,13 4 the Milwaukee Teacher's
Education Association 3 5 filed suit challenging the amended MPCP
statute on both state and U.S. constitutional grounds.'36
The
Wisconsin trial court invalidated the amended program on state
constitutional grounds and, as a result, did not address the alleged
137
violation of the Federal Establishment Clause.

In August 1997, the Wisconsin Court of Appeals upheld the trial
court decision, but also failed to address whether the MPCP violated
the Establishment Clause. 3 , The Wisconsin Supreme Court granted
the state's petition for review. 13 9 The court addressed both the state
and federal constitutional challenges; however, the scope of this
Comment addresses only the federal constitutional challenge on First
Amendment grounds. 14°
for all men through Jesus." Id. According to MPCP officials, no student has "opted out" of
prayer services. See Joe Loconte, Schools Learn that Vouchers Can Have a Hidden Cost, WALL
ST. J.,Jan. 26, 1999, at A18. However, future religious school participation in the MPCP and
similar programs around the nation may be hindered by an opt-out provision. For example, a
U.S. Department of Education Report revealed that of the nation's urban religious schools,
86% would not admit public school voucher students if they could be exempted from religious
activities. See id. Joseph McTighe, a member of the Council of American Private Education,
explained that the religious classrooms "marry the sacred and the secular" and these schools do
not want to compromise their religious mission. Id.
132. Prior to the injunction suspending the amended MPCP, 4000 Milwaukee Public School
pupils had applied to attend private schools. See Jackson, 570 N.W.2d at 414.
133. See id. at 413. Eighty-nine sectarian schools were added to the original MPCP eligible
list of 33 non sectarian schools. See id. In a study of 3000 nonpublic urban schools around the
nation, only 13% are non sectarian. See Ed Doerre, Having Cake and Eating It, Too,
HUMANIST, Mar. 1, 1999, at 34, 34.
134. See Clint Bolick, School Choice Is 'Life Preserver' for Disadvantaged Eliminating
Program that Helps Low-Income Children Would Mock Concept of Equal Education
Opportunity, MILWAUKEE J. SENTINEL, July 28, 1995, at All; see also Carol Innerst, ACLU
Tries to Halt Choice of 3,000 School Parents, WASH. TIMES, Aug. 2, 1995, at A2.
135. The plaintiffs included Warner Jackson, as citizens and taxpayers of Wisconsin,
American Civil Liberties Union Foundation, Americans United for Separation of Church and
state, Milwaukee Teachers' Education Association, and NAACP. See Jackson v. Benson, 578
N.W.2d 602, 605 (Wis. 1998), cert denied, 119 S.Ct. 466 (1998).
136. See id. at 609.
137. See id. at 610.
13& See id.
139. See id.
140. See id.
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The Wisconsin Supreme Court concluded that the amended
MPCP did not violate the Establishment Clause because it "ha[d] a
secular purpose,... [would] not have the primary effect of advancing
religion, and.. .[would] not lead to excessive entanglement between
the State and participating sectarian private schools. ' ' 141 In reaching
its decision, the court used the three-prong Lemon test. 142 Under the
first prong of Lemon, the court held that the purpose of the amended
MPCP was secular in nature because the statute's purpose was to
provide low-income families the opportunity of educating their
43
children outside the Milwaukee Public School system.
The court began its analysis of the second prong of the Lemon
test by synthesizing past Supreme Court decisions into a single
underlying theory that "state programs that are wholly neutral in
offering educational assistance directly to citizens in a class defined
without reference to religion do not have the primary effect of
advancing religion.' ' 144 Applying this theory to the MPCP, the court
recognized first the neutrality of the program in offering neutral
benefits to all children chosen on religion-neutral criteria. 145 Second,
the court recognized that the aid flowed to sectarian schools only as a
result of the private choices of parents. 146 Therefore, the court held
that the MPCP met the second Lemon test prong.
Finally, the court found that the MPCP satisfied the third prong
of the Lemon test since the MPCP did not require the state's
involvement in any day-to-day activities. 147 Therefore, the program
did not create any excessive entanglement between the state and
148
religious school.
On August 31, 1998, the Teacher's Union filed a petition to the
U.S. Supreme Court challenging the constitutionality of the MPCP. 149
On November 9, 1998, the Court in an 8-115° vote declined to hear the

141. Id. at 611.
142. See id. at 612.
143. See id.
144. Id. at 613.
145. See id. at 617.
146. See id.
147. See id. at 620.
148. See id.
149. See Joe Williams, Opponents Ask U.S. High Court to Review School Choice Program
Challenge puts Milwaukee system in position to set precedent for nation, MILWAUKEE J. &
SENTINEL, Sep. 1, 1998, at 1.
150. Justice Breyer would have granted certiorari. Jackson v. Benson, 578 N.W.2d 602 (Wis.
1998), cert. denied, 119 S.Ct. 466 (1998).
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case, thereby refusing to get involved in the "increasingly heated
national debate" about voucher programs. 5'
III. SEPARATING STATE AID FROM USE FOR RELIGIOUS
FUNCTIONS

A.

The Supreme Court's Refusal to Hear Jackson Spells Disasterfor
Public School Education

Many states will view the Court's refusal to hear Jackson as an
invitation to ratify a voucher plan similar to the MPCP. For example,
the senior advisor to the Mayor of New York City recently stated that
the Wisconsin Supreme Court's decision was "very helpful" and that
New York's program would be modeled after it. 112 In addition, Clint
Bolick of the Washington-based Institute for Justice predicts "more
legislative activity on school choice in 1999 than in any previous
year.' 15 3 According to Bolick, the governors of Texas, Florida and
Pennsylvania are making vouchers a top priority in their state
legislatures. 154 In addition, last year Congress approved a voucher
plan for the District of Columbia that was vetoed by President
Clinton.'5 5 After the veto, Clinton stated that "[w]e must strengthen
our public schools, not abandon them. This bill is fundamentally
misguided and a disservice to those children. ' 15 6 It is expected to be
157
revived again this year.
Some view the Court's denial of certiorari in Jackson as "simply
a statement that they [the justices] are waiting for another day.' 15 8 In
fact, the state Supreme Courts of Arizona, Vermont, and Ohio are
hearing cases about whether programs similar to the MPCP violate
the Establishment Clause." 9 Parties on both sides indicate that they
151. Greenburg, supra note 3, at 1.
152. Milwaukee School Choice Inspires New York Plan, MILWAUKEE J. SENTINEL, Jan. 15,
1999, at 5.
153. See Henry, supra note 128, at 1D.
154. See id.
155. See Ted C. Olsen, Voucher Victory, CHRISTIANITY TODAY, Sept. 7, 1998, at 72.
156. Id.
157. See id.
158. Greenburg, supra note 3, at 1 (quoting Barry Lynn, Executive Director of Americans
United for the Separation of Church and state).
159. See id. Ohio passed vouchers that let parents send their children to public or private
schools, including religious schools; See Matthew Robinson, National Issue School Choice Goes
to Court, INVESTOR'S BUS. DAILY, June 11, 1998, at Al. For towns in Maine and Vermont
without public schools, students attend non religious private schools with vouchers. See id. In
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will ask the U.S. Supreme Court to review the eventual rulings. 16° If
the Court rules any of these voucher programs unconstitutional, "it
161
could dismantle Milwaukee's program."
Unless the Supreme Court clarifies its position on school voucher
programs and the Establishment Clause, public school education
could be in serious trouble. In addition to violating the Establishment

Clause and offending earlier Supreme Court jurisprudence, voucher
programs divert money from public schools. The money is then
pumped into private schools that not only have the ability to turn
students away, but also accommodate only a limited number of
students. 162 For example, the MPCP program is capped at fifteen
percent of public school enrollment. 163 Thus, eighty-five percent of
Milwaukee public school students are not granted vouchers.' 64 These
students are left in a public school with less money and fewer
resources 65 as the Milwaukee Public School system is expected to lose
up to twenty-five million dollars with the MPCP in place. 16 6 One
Milwaukee parent stated that this likely means that classes will
continue to have too many children, and books will continue to be
167
old.
Some proponents of school vouchers argue that allowing a school
choice to parents will force the public schools to improve their

deteriorated conditions in order to remain competitive in the school
Arizona, the state provides tax credits to people who give money to scholarship funds. See id.
Parents may choose any school, including religious schools. See id.
160. See id.
161. Williams, supra note 149, at 1 (quoting Clint Bolick of the Institute for Justice).
162. See Lauren Marks, Vouchers: A Threat to Public Education, COURIER J., (Louisville,
Ky.), Feb. 28, 1999, at 1D.
163. See id.
164. See id.
165. "[V]ouchers serve only as a Band-aid to a few individuals, at the expense of the greater
good of the community." Id.
166. See Henry, supra note 128, at 1D. Ironically, Santa Fe, New Mexico, Archbishop
Michael Sheehan seems to have recognized the devastating impact that a full-blown school
vouchers system would have on the public schools. See Loie Fecteau, Voucher Plan Loses Ally,
ALBUQUERQUE J., Jan. 29, 1999, at Al. He stated that he no longer supported the New Mexico
Governor's school voucher plan because he believed it would take money away from the public
schools. See id. Sheehan stated that the voucher system could cause "very serious difficulties
for [the schools] to continue their educational task. We are partners with the public schools and
we're their friends." Id.
167. See Henry, supra note 128, at 1D. Moreover, a battle is brewing over opening the
MPCP to higher incomes. Even the MPCP's creator, State Representative Annette Polly
Williams, is preparing to battle the Wisconsin legislature to block support of extending the
program to other income classes. See Tamara Henry, 'Rosa Parks' of Choice Sits Out Voucher
Fight, USA TODAY, Jan. 5, 1999, at 6D. She wants to retain the original intent of the program,
which was for poor people of every race to have school choice. See id.
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choice market. 168 Although plausible in theory, this argument is
flawed since the public and private schools are not equal in terms of
public accountability.169 The public schools must not only adhere to
curriculum standards and anti-discrimination practices, but public
schools must also admit every student that wishes to attend. 170 On the
other hand, private schools are less accountable to the community.
Thus, they have more power to choose who to educate. 7' If they

choose not to help children with discipline problems, they can turn
those students away. 17 2 As one opponent to school choice programs
stated, "I have an uncomfortable vision of the public schools left only

with children with disabilities, children of parents who do not care if,
or where, their children attend and children who have been kicked
out of all the private schools.' 1 73 Without Supreme Court guidance,
states will continue to implement school voucher programs that
violate the Establishment Clause and hasten the demise of the public
174
school system.
B.

The MPCPhas the PrimaryEffect of Advancing Religion

The Jackson court attempted to define the second prong of the
Lemon test by synthesizing various Supreme Court decisions into a
168. See Marks, supra note 162, at 1D. In theory, voucher proponents argue that because
public schools will compete with the private schools for students, the competition will raise the
standards of public schools. See id.
169. See id. Sam Carmen, Executive Director of the Milwaukee Teachers Education
Association expressed concern about the public accountability of the MPCP. See Bobby Ross,
Jr., Vouchers Await Final Grade Inner-City Choice Important, Supporters Say, DAILY
OKLAHOMAN, Jan. 25, 1999, at 01. "Private schools that accept vouchers don't have to give
state achievement tests, don't have to follow anti-discrimination laws and don't have to account
for their finances." Id.
170. Id. On the other hand, most nonpublic schools use admission procedures not permitted
in public schools including: written applications (75%), student discipline reports (73%),
interviews with student (77%), interviews with parents (87%), standardized achievement tests
(58%), ability to perform at grade level (74%). See Ed Doerr, Having Cake and Eating It, Too,
HUMANIST, Mar. 1, 1999, at 34. In addition, "68 percent of nonpublic schools are either
"definitely" (41%) or "probably" (27%) "not interested" in accepting "special needs" children
with physical or mental problems or disabilities." Id.
171. See id.
172. See id.
173. Ross, supra note 169 at 01 (commenting on a proposed school choice program in
Oklahoma).
174. Ed Doerr, the President of American Humanist Association and Executive Director of
Americans for Religious Liberty, summarized the voucher remedy: "It would harm public
education, spur social fragmentation, subsidize sectarian indoctrination, dilute public control
over public spending, cost a great deal of money that could be better spent building new public
schools and rehabilitating old ones, further entangle religion and politics, and create a gigantic
administrative nightmare." Doerr, supra note 170, at 34.
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neat statement that "state programs that are wholly neutral in
offering educational assistance directly to citizens in a class defined

without reference to religion do not have the primary effect of
advancing religion.' 1 75 Without doubt, most Establishment Clause
decisions handed down by the Supreme Court square with this
176
neutrality statement quoted in Jackson.

However, as evidenced in Part I of this Comment, the Supreme
Court's determination of an Establishment Clause violation also
depends on the type of state-provided aid at issue in a case. Past

Supreme Court decisions fall into three distinct categories of aid: (1)
aid for specific services and special needs; (2) aid for instructional
materials and equipment; and (3) aid for tuition reimbursement or tax
deductions.

By analyzing Supreme Court decisions in terms of the type of aid
at issue, it becomes apparent that the second prong of the Lemon test
really requires making a two-step inquiry. When analyzing whether a
statute has the primary effect of advancing religion, a proper inquiry
asks: (1) whether the statute is wholly neutral in offering educational
assistance directly to citizens without reference to religion, and if so,

(2) whether the aid "realistically" can be separated from the religious
functions of the nonsecular schools. 177 Some forms of aid are easily
78
separable from religious functions while others are not.
175. Jackson v. Benson, 578 N.W.2d 602,613 (Wis. 1998), cert. denied, 119 S.Ct. 466 (1998).
176. See Wolman v. Walter, 433 U.S. 229, 236 (1977) (holding secular purpose of statute was
to create healthy educational environment); see also Committee for Pub. Educ. v. Nyquist, 413
U.S. 756, 773 (1973) (finding secular purpose of statute was to not overburden public schools).
177. Commenting on the MPCP in Wisconsin, Peter M. Kimball found three factors that in
his view stood out in past Establishment Clause Court decisions: (1) the extent to which a
statute is neutral in offering aid to all eligible pupils; (2) the aid flowing to religious schools
must be the result of "genuinely independent and private choices of aid recipients," and (3) the
state's aid cannot provide a "financial incentive for students to undertake sectarian education."
Kimball, supra note 108, at 863. Although Kimball's first two factors are important
considerations, he misses the most important factor: Is the aid realistically separable from the
religious functions of a religious school? In fact, if Kimball had included this factor, his third
factor is unnecessary. If the aid is earmarked strictly for the secular portion of a child's
education, no financial incentive to attend a religious school exists. Michael J. Stick proposed
two questions that a court should consider when determining whether aid to religious schools
has the primary effect of advancing religion: (1) Does the aid to sectarian schools exceed the
amount expended for the secular courses in the schools? and (2) Does the aid have a long
tradition of being provided to religious schools? See Stick supra note 12, at 469-72. Stick's first
question may be one way to quantify if aid can be realistically separated from religious
teachings. But how easy is it to accurately quantify the amount of money expended on secular
courses? In addition, there is no guarantee the money will not be spent on religious teachings
unless the limitation is specifically written into the statute.
178. See Zobrest v. Catalina Foothills Sch. Dist., 509 U.S. 1, 13 (1993) (finding sign language
interpreter did not teach religion when merely repeating the teacher); Committee for Pub.
Educ. v. Regan, 444 U.S. 646, 654 (1980) (finding non-public school neither controls results nor

1999]

JACKSON V. BENSON: SCHOOL VOUCHERS

Although the Jackson court was correct in starting its analysis by
inquiring into the neutrality of the program, the court incorrectly
stopped there. Without looking further to whether it was realistically
possible to prevent the tuition from being used for religious purposes,
the court reached a wrong decision in this case.
1.

Is the statute wholly neutral?

The Wisconsin Supreme Court correctly began its analysis by
looking to the neutrality of the MPCP. The MPCP clearly is neutral.
All children in the city of Milwaukee whose parents meet the income
guidelines are eligible. 17 9 In addition, the MPCP makes aid available
to parents without regard to the nature of the school the child
attends.18° To support its position, the court cited Supreme Court
decisions involving aid for services by sign language interpreters,s1
services by remedial education instructors, 182 the cost of
58
84
transportation, 18 assistance to a blind student, and textbook loans.
In each case, the aid was offered neutrally to all children without
regard to the type of school the child attended. Thus, the Wisconsin
Supreme Court was satisfied that the neutral program did not violate
the Establishment Clause. However, the Wisconsin Supreme Court
prematurely ended its analysis and failed to analyze the next critical
question: Can the aid realistically be separated from the school's
religious functions?
2.

Can the aid be realistically separated from the religious
functions?

The Wisconsin Supreme Court should have addressed whether
the aid provided by the MPCP realistically would be used for only the
school's secular functions. By classifying the type of aid into three
categories: (1) special services; (2) instructional materials and
equipment and; (3) tuition reimbursements or tax deductions, it
becomes clear what type of aid realistically can be separated from a
contents of tests and thus prevents any religious teachings as part of test); Meek v. Pittenger,
421 U.S. 349, 362 (1975) (finding textbooks could only be used for purely secular purposes).
179. WIS. STAT. §119.23, at (2)(b).
180. See id.
181. See Zobrest, 509 U.S. at 13.
182. See Agostini v. Felton, 521 U.S. 203, 204 (1997).
183. See Everson v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. 1. 18 (1947).
184. See Witters v. Washington Dep't of Serv. for the Blind, 474 U.S. 481, 483 (1986).
185. See Wolman v. Walter, 433 U.S. 229, 233 (1977).
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school's religious functions.
a.

State aid for specific services and special needs

Unlike tuition aid offered in the MPCP, aid for specific secular
services and special needs generally can be realistically separated
from a school's religious functions. Consequently, this type of aid
does not offend the Establishment Clause. These services include
testing, bus transportation, and special education. For example, in
Regan, state reimbursements for testing services were clearly
identifiable, and hence separable. 116 The nonpublic schools controlled
neither the test's content nor its results. 187 The Regan Court stated
that its holding would likely have been different if there were "no
effective means for insuring that the cash disbursements [for testing
services] would cover only secular services. '' 88 Similarly, in Everson
bus transportation was easy to separate from the religious purposes of
a school. 189
In the special education services arena, aid to a blind student in
Witters resulted in only a "minuscule amount" of aid flowing to the
religious part of the student's education.19°
A sign language
interpreter in Zobrest did no more than sign what was being taught. 9'
The interpreter advanced no religious ideals. The Court in Agostini
presumed that the remedial education teacher, guidance and job
counselors, all remained neutral in their teachings and did not impart
religion in the religious schools. 192 Once again, the aid was fairly
traceable to only the secular educational functions of the religious
schools.
On the other hand, aid for maintenance and repair of religious
schools in Nyquist was not easy to separate from the secular functions
of the school. 193 It was impractical to expect that the aid could be
used to maintain only secular parts of the building. Thus, the Court
ruled that kind of aid a violation of the Establishment Clause. 94
186. See Committee for Pub. Educ. v. Regan, 444 U.S. 646, 660 (1980).
187. See id. at 656.
188. Id. at 659.
189. See Everson, 330 U.S. at 17.
190. Witters, 474 U.S. at 486.
191. See Zobrest v. Catalina Foothills Sch. Dist., 509 U.S. 1, 13 (1993).
192. See Agostini v. Felton, 521 U.S. 203, 216 (1997).
193. See Committee for Pub. Educ. v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756, 774 (1973) (stating that "[n]o
attempt is made to restrict payments to those expenditures related to the upkeep of facilities
used exclusively for secular purposes, nor do we think it possible").
194. See id.
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b.

State aid for instructional materials and equipment

Unlike tuition aid offered in the MPCP, many forms of aid for
instructional materials can be realistically separated from a school's
religious functions, and thus does not offend the Establishment
Clause. For example, the Court in Allen reasoned that only secular
textbooks approved by public school authorities were allowed as a
part of the loan program. 95 Specific textbooks for teaching math,
reading, and spelling could realistically be used for teaching only the
secular portion of a religious school's program.' 96 In contrast, the
Court in Meek and Wolman decided that separating the secular uses
from religious uses of loaned equipment and other instructional
197
materials, like maps and film projectors, was unrealistic.
c.

State aid for tuition reimbursements or tax deductions

The Jackson case falls within the category of state aid for tuition
reimbursements. Nyquist is the only United States Supreme Court
case directly addressing aid through tuition reimbursements to
parents of children in nonpublic schools. Thus, the Jackson court
should have followed the Nyquist holding.
Although the Mueller Court upheld tuition reimbursement via
tax deductions to parents, the facts are distinguishable from Nyquist
in several ways. 198 First, the Mueller Court upheld state income tax
deductions to parents for a combination of tuition, transportation and
secular textbook expenses. 199 The Mueller holding may have been
different if the statute had only allowed a tax deduction for tuition.
But since the Court held in Meek and Everson that textbooks and
transportation were permissible, the tuition portion may have slipped
through with the other deductions. The Court's attempt to reconcile
195. See Meek v. Pittenger, 421 U.S. 349, 362 (1975) (stating that the statute did not suggest
that loaned textbooks would be used for anything other than purely secular purposes); See
Board of Educ. v. Allen, 392 U.S. 236, 245 (1968) (holding that loaned textbooks are not to be
used to teach religion).
196. See Allen, 392 U.S. at 248.
197. See Meek, 421 U.S. at 365 (stating that material and equipment used for nonideological
purposes is simply ignoring reality); see also Wolman v. Walter, 433 U.S. 229, 250 (1977) (stating
that separating the secular education part of using equipment from the sectarian is impossible).
It seems unrealistic to separate lab equipment or a film strip projector consistently apart from
the religious teachings of the school. For example, would the projector be labeled "for secular
films only?"
198. Ten years after Chief Justice Rehnquist dissented in Nyquist, he authored the majority
opinion in Mueller. See Edward A. Zelinsky, Are Tax "Benefits" Constitutionally Equivalent to
Direct Expenditures, 112 HARV. L. REV. 379, 397 (1998).
199. See id.
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its holding in Nyquist simply stated that the Mueller statute "bears
less resemblance to the arrangement struck down in Nyquist than it
does to prior assistance programs upheld in our prior decisions. '' 2°°
Moreover, the Mueller Court chose not to question Nyquist as good
law.201
Second, Professor Edward A. Zelinsky proposed that Mueller
and Nyquist are distinguishable because one form of aid is a tax
deduction as opposed to a tuition reimbursement.202 Zelinsky reasons
that Mueller's tax deduction is "constitutional even if it benefits
parochial school parents as long as it retains important tax-type
characteristics" like being part of a standing tax code that allows
deductions for a variety of expenditures. 203 In contrast, Nyquist's
tuition reimbursement to parents crosses the line into "forbidden
territory" where the aid resembles direct spending by the state to
24
benefit religious schools. 0
Finally, the Mueller decision may simply be incorrect based on
the Court's earlier holding in Nyquist. States that cannot directly
reimburse parents should not be allowed to indirectly reimburse
parents through a tax benefit. 205 Nyquist remains good law whether
the Mueller decision is incorrect or distinguishable from Nyquist.
Since the MPCP most resembles Nyquist's tuition reimbursement
program, the Jackson court should have followed that decision.
Based on the Nyquist holding, it seems clear that the type of aid
provided by the MPCP violates the Establishment Clause. Unlike
textbooks, sign language interpreters, and bus transportation, tuition
to nonpublic schools realistically is not separable from a religious
school's nonsecular functions. The MPCP does not limit the purposes
for which sectarian schools may use tuition funds.206 Therefore the
funds could be used for employee salaries, purchase of religious

200. Mueller v. Allen, 463 U.S. 388, 394 (1983).
201. See Kimball, supra note 108, at 859.
202. See Zelinsky, supra note 198, at 431.
203. Id.
204. Id. In addition, the court in Mueller only addressed the part of Nyquist's ruling related
to the tax deduction, not the tuition reimbursement in Nyquist made directly to parents. See
Mueller, 463 U.S. at 396. Mueller characterized the tax deduction in Nyquist as a sham given
that it was based on a formula rather than directly related to the actual tuition paid by parents.
See id. On the other hand, the tax deduction in Mueller was directly related to actual
educational expenses incurred by parents. See id.
205. See Hugh F. Smart, Tax Deductions as Permissible State Aid to ParochialSchools:
Mueller v. Allen 103 S. Ct. 3062 (1983), 60 CHI-KENT L. REV. 657,679 (1984).
206. See Jackson v. Benson, 570 N.W.2d 407, 414 (1997).

1999]

JACKSON V. BENSON: SCHOOL VOUCHERS

materials, or maintenance of its building. 2 7 Such types of aid have
been struck down in previous U.S. Supreme Court decisions.
In Nyquist, the Court rejected the tuition reimbursement plan as
unconstitutional mainly because it was impossible to guarantee that
the funds would be used exclusively for "secular, neutral, and
nonideological purposes. '20 8 Similarly, with the MPCP it is impossible
to guarantee that funds are used only for secular purposes.
In reaching its decision, the Wisconsin Supreme Court
emphasized the neutrality of the statute through parental choice and
20 9
the payment of tuition to parents rather than directly to schools.
Although a statute's parental choice is relevant to establishing a
statute's neutrality, the court must still inquire about the type of aid
the statute is providing. The MPCP dollars ultimately fall into the
coffers of the religious schools whether the check is written directly to
the school or made out to the parent and endorsed over to the school.
The state account is debited by the cashing of the check by the
religious school.
It is both impractical and unrealistic to separate out that portion
of the tuition, which funds only the secular activities of the school. It
would be different if the state check was to reimburse the parent or
school for the transportation expenses of the children or for a sign
language interpreter. Both of these are permissible uses under U.S.
Supreme Court jurisprudence because the services can be attributed
to secular functions of a religious school. Tuition in general
realistically cannot be applied solely to a religious school's secular
functions.
The word "realistically" could also be replaced with the word
"reasonably." State-provided aid that a reasonable person considers
separable from religious functions of a school is certainly permissible.
A reasonable person likely considers secular textbooks and special
education services fairly easy to separate from religious teachings. A
math or reading book borrowed from the public schools is a likely
resource used to teach secular subjects. A special education teacher
who is helping a child with speech is also a likely resource that is
neutral toward religion.
On the other hand, a reasonable person would not likely
207. See id.
208. Nyquist, 413 U.S. at 780.
209. See Jackson v. Benson, 578 N.W.2d 602, 618 (Wis. 1998), cert. denied, 119 S.Ct. 466
(1998).
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consider tuition to a religious school easy to separate from the
religious functions. This is especially true if no limitations are written
into the statute as to how the tuition may be used by the school.
Lacking restraints, tuition could be applied to updating a religious
school's facilities, paying a religious teacher's salary, or funding the
purchase of religious materials. Attempting to track and account for
general tuition broken by secular and nonsecular expenditures is not
only impractical, but also inefficient. No reasonable person would
expect these procedures to be accurate or even possible for every
child whose tuition is paid by the state.
Some scholars suggest that "over the last fifteen years, the
Supreme Court has adopted a more accomodationist approach" to
cases involving state aid to religious schools.210 And indeed, recent
Supreme Court decisions favored some types of state aid to religious
schools.2 1' However, like the Jackson court, the scholars failed to
adequately consider the type of aid allowed by the Court in each case
including assistance to a blind person,212 an interpreter for a deaf
2
person, 213 and public school teachers providing remedial education. 14

No recent case before the Court resembled tuition reimbursement.
The Court's decision twenty-six years ago in Nyquist is the only case
on point with the MPCP.2 1' Nyquist is still good law and the Jackson
210. Joseph P. Viteritti, Blaine's Wake: School Choice, the First Amendment, and State
ConstitutionalLaw, 21 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 657, 718 (1998); Kimball, supra note 108, at
871 (stating that based on recent precedent established by Agostini, "it is apparent that the
Choice Program has as strong a case as ever under the Supreme Court's Establishment Clause
jurisprudence."); see also Margaret A. Nero, The Cleveland Scholarship and Tutoring Program:
Why Voucher Programs Do Not Violate the Establishment Clause, 58 OHIO ST. L.J. 1103, 1134
(1997) (stating that the Court's "non-alarmist" position on state-aid to religious schools in the
recent Agostini ruling signaled that schools vouchers are constitutional); Doug Roberson, The
Supreme Court's Shifting Tolerancefor PublicAid to ParochialSchools and the Implicationsfor
Educational Choice: Agostini v. Felton, 117 S. Ct. 1997, 21 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 861, 864
(1997) (stating that in recent years the Supreme Court's Establishment Clause jurisprudence
reveals a willingness to uphold public aid to parochial schools); Ronald D. Rotunda, The
ConstitutionalFuture of the Bill of Rights: A Closer Look at CommercialSpeech and State Aid to
-ReligiouslyAffiliated Schools, 65 N.C. L. REv. 917, 931 (1987) (stating that "it is not difficult to
find Supreme Court case law which concludes that no aid (to parochial schools) is allowed. Yet
if we look at the recent case law more carefully, it seems that the opposite conclusion is equally
tenable.")
211. See Agostini v. Felton, 521 U.S. 203, 204 (1997) (upholding public school teachers
providing remedial education in nonpublic schools); Zobrest v. Catalina Foothills Sch. Dist., 509
U.S. 1, 13 (1993) (state provided interpreter to disabled student in Catholic school upheld);
Witters v. Washington Dep't of Serv. for the Blind, 474 U.S. 481, 483 (1986) (upholding state
assistance to blind person studying at Christian College).
212. See Witters, 474 U.S. at 483.
213. See Zobrest, 509 U.S. at 13.
214. See Agostini, 521 U.S. at 204.
215. See generally Committee for Pub. Educ. v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756 (1973).
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court should have followed it.216
CONCLUSION

Unless the Supreme Court clearly states whether and how school
voucher programs are limited by the Establishment Clause, states will
continue to flounder, with the ultimate victim being the nation's
public school systems. Over the last forty years, the Supreme Court
has addressed many Establishment Clause cases involving a variety of
state aid to religious schools including bus transportation, special
education teachers, textbooks, equipment, testing services, building
maintenance, tuition reimbursement, and tax deductions to parents.
Past Supreme Court decisions point to two inquiries that a court
must address when deciding Establishment Clause violations: (1)
whether the statute is wholly neutral in offering educational
assistance directly to citizens without reference to religion, and if so
(2) whether the aid "realistically" can be separated from the
nonsecular functions of the religious school. Generally, aid that
realistically can be separated from the religious purposes of the
school does not violate the Establishment Clause. However, some
forms of aid realistically cannot be separated.
Jackson correctly held that the MPCP is offered neutrally to all
children without regard to the type of school attended. However,
Jackson failed to address the second inquiry of whether tuition could
"realistically" be separated from the nonsecular functions of the
religious school. If the Jackson court had inquired about the ease of
applying tuition to only the secular functions of the religious school,
its holding likely would and should have been different. With the
preservation of the nation's public schools system at stake, the
Supreme Court needs to "rise above the tremendous mess it has
created and meaningfully interpret and apply the Establishment
7
Clause." 21

216. In support of this, the Harvard Law Review stated that, "Since Nyquist, the Court has
tended to uphold neutral and indirect educational aid programs against Establishment Clause
challenges. But the Court has never upheld a program when it has been clearly foreseeable that
it would substantially aid religious schools. Nyquist remains good law, and the Jackson court
should have applied it." Establishment Clause-School Vouchers- Wisconsin Supreme Court
Upholds Milwaukee ParentalChoice Program, 112 HARV. L. REV. 737, 740-41 (1999).
217. Stick, supra note 12, at 473.

